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Empirical evidence from the U.S. and the European Union suggests that regions which 
contribute to interregional redistribution face weaker borrowing constraints than regions 
which benefit from interregional redistribution. This paper presents an argument in favor of 
such differentiated budgetary institutions. It develops a two-period model of a federation 
consisting of two types of regions. The federal government redistributes from one type of 
regions (contributors) to the other type (recipients). It is shown that a fiscal constitution with 
lax budget rules for contributors and strict budget rules for recipients solves the self-selection 
problem the federal government faces in the presence of asymmetric information regarding 
exogenous characteristics of the regions. 
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Constraints on public borrowing are widespread among U.S. states. The National
Association of State Budget Oﬃce (1992) reports that all states but Vermont have
statutory or constitutional balanced budget requirements or debt limits. Such budget
institutions restrict the government’s bond ﬁnance of current outlays. But there is a
large variation in the stringency of budget rules. For instance, some states exempt
special programs like capital funds, some states are allowed to issue short-term debt
carrying over deﬁcits to the next ﬁscal year, and some states may borrow on the behalf
of a public referendum. Poterba (1996) argues that anti-deﬁcit rules are usually more
stringent in small states than in large states. Furthermore, it is well known that federal
taxes and transfers in the U.S. redistribute resources from high-income to low-income
states (e.g. Bayoumi and Masson, 1995, M´ elitz and Zumer, 2002). Taken together
these two observations we may conclude that, ceteris paribus, states which contribute
to interregional redistribution face weaker borrowing constraints than states which
beneﬁt from interregional redistribution.
There is a similar budget institution in the European Union. The Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) restricts the annual deﬁcit of member states to 3% of GDP. If a
country violates this requirement, the European Commission triggers an institutional
procedure which induces the country to bring down its deﬁcit. In recent years, some
countries did not satisfy the borrowing constraint. Portugal and Netherland temporar-
ily violated the criterion in 2001 and 2003, respectively. France and Germany have run
excessive deﬁcits since 2002 and Greece has not met the 3%-criterion since 2001. In light
of this experience, the European Commission recently proposed a council regulation
on clarifying the excessive deﬁcit procedure. One important change is that in identi-
fying an excessive deﬁcit ”... special consideration will be given to budgetary eﬀorts
towards increasing or maintaining at a high level ﬁnancial contributions to fostering
international solidarity and to achieving European policy goals, notably the uniﬁcation
of Europe ...” (Commission of the European Communities, 2005). This amendment
especially aims at the member countries’ (net) payments to the budget of the European
Union. Since one of the main purposes of this budget is to redistribute between the
member states, we come to a similar conclusion as for the U.S.: Net contributors in the
European Union will be subject to weaker borrowing constraints than net recipients.
1It is well known from the public ﬁnance literature, that ﬁscal institutions are not only
’veils’ that leave unaltered the budget of a country. In a series of interesting papers, von
Hagen (1991), Poterba (1994, 1995, 1996) and Poterba and Rueben (2001) empirically
investigate the impact of diﬀerent budgetary institutions on the spending behavior of
the U.S. states. They inter alia ﬁnd that public indebtedness is substantially higher in
states with weak balanced budget requirements than in other states. This is exactly the
reason why many researchers, politicians and central bankers are seriously concerned
about relaxing the excessive deﬁcit procedure of the SGP in the European Union. One
implication will be that the member countries, especially the large countries which
are also the net contributors of the European Union, may run larger deﬁcits inducing
the European Central Bank to ﬁght inﬂationary pressure on the common currency by
raising interest rates (e.g. Feldstein, 2005).
While this reasoning is right from a monetary point of view, the present paper
argues that a ﬁscal constitution with strict borrowing rules for recipient countries
and lax borrowing rules for contributing countries of a federation may nonetheless
beneﬁcial, if considered in the realm of ﬁscal federalism. Our main argument in favor
of diﬀerentiated budget rules is that it can solve the self-selection problem a federal
government faces in the presence of asymmetric information. We develop a two-period
model of a federation consisting of a federal government (center) and two types of
regions. The center redistributes from one type of regions (contributors) to the other
type (recipients). Each region levies an income tax on its residents and supplies a local
public good. In the ﬁrst period, a region can generate additional revenue by issuing
debt which has to be repaid in the second period. The types of regions diﬀer in an
exogenously given characteristic. In our basic model, we focus on diﬀerent rates of time
preference. But in a modiﬁed model, it is argued that the results remain completely
unchanged under other sources of heterogeneity, for example, diﬀerences in the cost of
regional public services or diﬀerences in labor productivity.
In this ﬁscal federalism model, we ﬁrst characterize the welfare optimum under full
information and asymmetric information. In the latter case, the exogenously given
characteristic is private information of the regions and cannot be observed by the fed-
eral government. It is then shown that the federal government can implement the full
information optimum by a simple redistribution scheme consisting of lump-sum taxes
2and transfers. But under asymmetric information, incentive compatibility requires that
the federal government distorts the intertemporal allocation in recipient states in favor
of future public consumption. It therefore cannot implement the asymmetric infor-
mation optimum by the simple redistribution system. Eﬃciency is attained, however,
if the redistribution scheme is augmented by a limit on public borrowing in recipient
regions. The limit restricts current spending and eﬀectively shifts public consumption
from the present to the future. Since it applies to recipients only, budget institutions
in the federation are more stringent for recipients than for contributors.
This result has normative as well as positive implications. The normative implica-
tions are important especially from an European point of view. The result shows that
diﬀerentiated borrowing constraints for contributors and recipients in the European
Union can be justiﬁed on eﬃciency grounds. This economic beneﬁt of an institutional
change in the excessive deﬁcit procedure of the SGP has to be balanced against pos-
sible drawbacks. The positive implications are relevant especially for the U.S. states.
While a lot of studies identify the impact of diﬀerent budget institutions on e.g. the
states’ spending behavior, to the best of our knowledge no attention has been paid to
the question why states face diﬀerent borrowing restrictions. As we will argue in more
detail, our result can be interpreted as a pork barrel policy. The federal government
redistributes resources to a state, but only if the state is willing to accept and imple-
ment a stringent budget rule. This argument may help to explain the large variation
in the stringency of budget institutions among U.S. states.
The driving force of our results is the assumption of asymmetric information. This
assumption is based on empirical grounds. For example, in determining a Ramsey-
type social discount rate for six major countries, Evans and Sezer (2004) have to ﬁgure
out the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (e), the long-run growth rate of
per-capita consumption (g) and the pure rate of time preference (p). While presenting
rigorous econometric estimates of e and g, they recognize ”... the diﬃculty of settling
on a suitable measure of p ...” (p. 558) and make assumptions on the appropriate
value of p. If it is diﬃcult for researchers to assess the rate of time preference of major
countries, it will also hardly be possible for federal governments to infer this rate in the
regions of a federation. Similar evidence on asymmetric information regarding other
regional characteristics can be found in previous literature which we will refer to below.
3Our analysis is related to two lines of economic literature. First, there is an extensive
and interesting literature on asymmetric information in federations. This literature dis-
cusses optimal interregional redistribution under asymmetric information with respect
to income or the preference for public goods (Lockwood, 1999), the cost of public goods
(Lockwood, 1999, Cornes and Silva, 2002) and labor productivity (Raﬀ and Wilson,
1997, Bordignon et al. 2001). Cremer et al. (1996) consider the case where both in-
come and the preference for a public good are private information of the regions. The
consequence of asymmetric information in a tax competition framework is analyzed in
Bucovetsky et al. (1998). Cornes and Silva (2003) determine the optimal spending mix
under private information and Huber and Runkel (2005) use the self-selection approach
to rationalize speciﬁc types of intergovernmental grants. But all these articles use one-
period models and, thus, do not capture the implications of asymmetric information
for regional public debt and the design of budget institutions in a federation.
Second, our paper is also related to the literature on budget institutions. For exam-
ple, the literature on the political economy of public debt provides arguments in favor
of borrowing rules. Tabellini and Alesina (1990) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990)
show that political instability leads to time-inconsistent preferences of policy makers
and so gives rise to excessive and ex-ante ineﬃcient deﬁcits. A balanced budget rule
serves as commitment device and restores eﬃciency. Peletier et al. (1999) extend this
framework and argue that a balanced budget rule causes ineﬃcient underinvestment
of the public sector. They propose a ’Golden Rule of Government Finance’ requiring
the public deﬁcit to be equal to public investment. There are many other theoretical
papers on budget institutions, for example, the analysis of Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe
(1997) on the role of a balanced budget rule in a neoclassical growth framework. But
all these models do not discuss public debt and budgetary institutions in federations
and therefore do not provide a rationale for diﬀerentiated budget rules.1
The paper is organized as follows. As a further motivation, in Section 2 we ﬁrst
present an econometric estimation which clariﬁes the evidence from the U.S.. Section
3 describes the basic theoretical model. In Section 4 and 5, we derive the welfare
1Regional debt is analyzed in the models of Goodspeed (2002) and Schultz and Sj¨ ostr¨ om (2001,
2004). But the former author focusses on bailouts in federations and the latter discuss the relation of
migration and debt. They do not refer to the budget institutions considered in our paper.
4optimum and show how this optimum can be implemented by a suitable redistribution
scheme. Section 6 brieﬂy discusses the robustness of the results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
The evidence from the European Union is quite clear. If the proposed council regulation
of the European Commission is implemented, and there is no doubt that it will, then
the excessive debt procedure will be less restrictive for contributors than for recipients.
While the 3%-criterion will be strictly applied to the recipient countries, contributing
countries face a borrowing limit which eﬀectively is larger than 3% of GDP.
The evidence from the U.S. is less obvious since, strictly speaking, there is no such
explicit redistribution system as in Europe. However, it is well known that federal
taxes and transfers implicitly redistribute resources between the states. For example,
Bayoumi and Masson (1995) and M´ elitz and Zumer (2002) deﬁne a state’s relative
per capita personal income as that state’s per capita personal income divided by the
average per capita personal income of all states. They estimate the relation between
the relative incomes before and after federal taxes and transfers. The results suggest
that the U.S. federal government redistributes about 20 cent of every dollar diﬀerence
in pre-tax incomes. Hence, redistribution from states with above average income to
states with below average income is clearly an element of the U.S. tax system.
To bridge the gap to our analysis of interregional redistribution and budget insti-
tutions, we will now estimate the impact of the relative per capita income on the
stringency of borrowing rules in the U.S. states. Data on per capita personal income
from 1969 to 2004 are provided by the U.S. Commerce Department. With the help of
these data, we compute the variable RELINC which gives a state’s relative per capita
personal income before federal taxes and transfers. For each state, we take the average
of this variable over the whole time period 1969 to 2004. Data on the stringency of
budgetary institutions are available from the Advisory Council of Intergovernmental
Relations (1987, 1998) and Poterba and Rueben (2001). They provide an index BUD-
STR ranging from 0 (lax budget rules) to 10 (stringent budget rules). The scatterplot
in Figure 1 illustrates the relation between BUDSTR and RELINC.
The plot suggests that high-income states (contributors) really tend to have weaker
5Figure 1: Budget Stringency and Relative Per Capita Income in U.S. States
borrowing rules than low-income states (recipients). This hypothesis can be tested by a
simple probit regression. RELINC is taken as the independent variable. As dependent
variable we construct an indicator BUDIND that receives the value 1, if BUDSTR is
9 or 10. BUDIND is set equal to zero, if BUDSTR is below 9. Since the mean of
BUDSTR lies between 8 and 9, BUDIND divides the set of all states into states with
above average budget stringency and states with below average budget stringency. A
further motivation for BUDIND is that a state scores a 9 or 10 for BUDSTR only if it
requires a strict balanced budget at the end of the ﬁscal year. A value of 8 for BUDSTR
already indicates that the state is allowed to run a short-run deﬁcit. If BUDIND is
equal to zero (one), the borrowing constraint is said to be weak (strict).2
The results of our probit regression are displayed in Table 1. The coeﬃcient of
RELINC is of the expected sign and statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level.
To assess the economic signiﬁcance, we deﬁne the average recipient (contributor) as
the state with average per capita income among all states with RELINC < 1 (RELINC
> 1). It is then straightforward to compute the predicted probability of the average
recipient having a strict budget rule as 81.20%. In contrast, the average contributor
2Poterba and Rueben (2001) use a similar indicator variable, but draw the line of demarcation
between weak and strict budget institutions at BUDSTR = 6. Under this indicator variable our
empirical results slightly change, but the main conclusion remains the same.
6Table 1: Impact of Relative Income on Budget Stringency in U.S. States
Dependent variable: BUDIND
coeﬀ. std.err. z-statistic p-value 95% conf. interval








Notes: (i) observations: 50, (ii) log likelihood = −26.306, (iii) pseudo R2 = 0.227.
faces a strict borrowing constraint with a probability of 32.97% only. Hence, also in the
U.S. there is a clear evidence that borrowing restrictions tend to be weaker in states
which contribute to interregional redistribution than in other states.
3 Theoretical Model
We consider a two-period model of a federation consisting of a federal government and
several regions. There are two types of regions indexed by s and h. The number of type
s and type h regions is denoted by ms ≥ 1 and mh ≥ 1, respectively. The diﬀerence
between the types of regions will be explained below. For the time being, we note
that each region is populated by a cohort of n identical individuals which live for one
period only. After the period 1 cohort has passed away, in period 2 there is a new
cohort of exactly the same size. In period t = 1,2, an individual in a region of type
i = s,h consumes cti units of a private good, gti units of a local public good supplied
by the regional government and xti = 1 − ℓti units of leisure. ℓti is the individual’s
labor supply. Utility of the individual is given by
ui = cti + W(xti) + U(gti). (1)
The functions W and U satisfy Wx > 0, Wxx < 0, Ug > 0 and Ugg < 0, where
subscripts indicate partial derivatives. Utility is assumed to be quasi-linear in order
to abstract from income eﬀects in the supply of the local public good. In period t,
the representative individual in region i maximizes utility (1) subject to the budget
constraint cti = (1 − τti)ℓti, where τti is the tax rate of an income tax imposed by the
local government. The ﬁrst-order condition of utility maximization is
1 − τti − Wx(1 − ℓti) = 0. (2)
7It determines the individual’s optimal labor supply as a function of the local tax rate,
i.e. ℓti = L(τti) with Lτ(τti) = 1/Wxx < 0 and Lττ(τti) = Wxxx/(Wxx)3 < 0.3
Inserting the optimal labor supply in (1) gives the indirect utility function of the
representative individual in region i and period t. The present value of region i’s (per
capita) welfare can then be written as
vi = (1 − τ1i)L(τ1i) + W[1 − L(τ1i)] + U(g1i)
+ δi
h
(1 − τ2i)L(τ2i) + W[1 − L(τ2i)] + U(g2i)
i
. (3)
δi = 1/(1 + ρi) ∈ ]0,1] denotes the discount factor and ρi ≥ 0 is the discount rate
or, equivalently, the rate of time preference in region i. We assume δs < δh. A region
of type s has a smaller discount factor (a higher discount rate) than a region of type
h. Type s regions discount the future more and place lower weight on the well-being
of future generations than type h regions. Thus, δi can also be interpreted as an
intergenerational altruism parameter of the ﬁrst-period inhabitants of region i.
In each period, the local government of a type i region ﬁnances its public good
supply by the revenue of the income tax. Moreover, in period 1 it additionally receives
a transfer zi from the central government and may issue debt bi. The debt plus interest
payments has to be paid back in period 2. We assume that all regions borrow on the
world capital market and take as given the interest rate r ≥ 0. The local government’s
budget constraints in period 1 and 2 can be written as, respectively,
g1i = nτ1iL(τ1i) + bi + zi, g2i = nτ2iL(τ2i) − (1 + r)bi. (4)
The transfer from the center is not restricted in sign. If it is negative, it represents a
tax that the federal government imposes on a type i region. As we explain in more
detail below, the sole objective of the center is to optimally redistribute between the
regions. Its budget constraint reads
mszs + mhzh = 0. (5)
3Note that Wx > 0 and Wxx < 0 imply Wxxx > 0, provided all derivatives of W are monotone for
x ≥ 0 (Menegatti, 2001). The most frequently used utility functions have monotone derivatives, for
instance, the CES function W(x) = (x1−α − 1)/(1 − α) with α ∈]0,1], which for α = 1 encompasses
the logarithmic function W(x) = ln{1+x}, and the exponential function W(x) = 1−exp{−αx} with
α > 0. A counterexample is W(x) = αx − βx2 with x < α/2β and α,β > 0. This function implies
Wxxx = 0. But we then obtain Lττ = 0 and all our subsequent results remain true.
8This budget constraint completes the model. It implies that the center collects re-
sources from one type of regions to ﬁnance the transfers to the other type of regions.4
For the proofs of our results, it it is useful to determine the properties of a region’s
preferences in the debt-transfer space. For this, we maximize region i’s welfare (3) with
respect to the ﬁrst- and second-period income tax rates and, for the time being, take
as given debt and the federal transfer. The result is the region’s welfare function
V (b,z,δ) = max
τ1,τ2
½
(1 − τ1)L(τ1) + W[1 − L(τ1)] + U[nτ1L(τ1) + b + z]
+ δ
h
(1 − τ2)L(τ2) + W[1 − L(τ2)] + U[nτ2L(τ2) − (1 + r)b]
i¾
, (6)
where, for notational convenience, the region index i is suppressed. The ﬁrst-order
conditions of the maximization problem in (6) can be written as
nUg(g1) = 1 −
τ1Lτ(τ1)
L(τ1) + τ1Lτ(τ1)




with g1 = nτ1L(τ1) + b + z and g2 = nτ2L(τ2) − (1 + r)b. Equation (7) represents the
well-known modiﬁed Samuelson rule for the provision of public goods in the presence
of distortionary income taxation (e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). In each period,
the sum of the marginal willingness to pay for the public good is equated to the
marginal cost of the public good and the tax distortion cost. Hence, in our model the
intratemporal supply of the public good is distorted by the income tax only, independent
of the information structure. Equation (7) also implies L(τt) + τtLτ(τt) > 0, i.e. the
regions are always on the increasing side of the Laﬀer curve.
Equation (7) determines the region’s optimal income tax rates as functions of debt
and the federal transfer. Formally, we have τ1 = T 1(b,z) and τ2 = T 2(b) with
T
1
b (b,z) = T
1


























4Attention is restricted to redistribution in period 1 since we are interested in the relation between
redistribution and public borrowing, the latter taking place also in the ﬁrst period only. But it is
straightforward to show that our main results are not aﬀected, if the federal government is supposed
to redistribute in the second period or in both periods.
9where Lt := L(τt), Lt
τ := Lτ(τt), Ut
g := Ug(gt) and so on. The denominators of (8)
and (9) are negative due to the second-order conditions of the maximization problem
(6). Equation (8) states that an increase in public borrowing or in the federal transfer
allows to reduce the income tax rate in period 1. According to (9), higher debt requires
a larger tax rate in period 2 since debt has to be repaid in the second period.
Applying the envelope theorem to the region’s welfare function (6), we obtain the






Ug[nτ1L(τ1) + b + z] − δ(1 + r)Ug[nτ2L(τ2) − (1 + r)b]
Ug[nτ1L(τ1) + b + z]
, (10)



























Hence, the indiﬀerence curve is U-shaped with the minimum at the point where the
intertemporal rate of substitution equals the intertemporal rate of transformation, i.e.
Ug(g1)/δUg(g2) = 1 + r. To understand the diﬀerence between a s-region indiﬀerence
curve and a h-region indiﬀerence curve, diﬀerentiate (10) with respect to the discount















δh > δs implies that, in every point in the (b,z)-space, the indiﬀerence curve of a
h-region has larger slope than the indiﬀerence curve of a s-region. This property
represents the single-crossing property in our model. Two given indiﬀerence curves of
h-regions and s-regions cross only once.
4 Welfare Optimum
In this section, we analyze the welfare maximizing policy of the federal government. In
doing so, we consider two diﬀerent information structures. As a benchmark, attention
is paid to the case in which the federal government is able to observe all variables and
characteristics of the regions. The associated welfare optimum is called full information
10optimum. In the second case, the rate of time preference is private information of the
regions. The federal government cannot infer whether a region places low or high weight
on the welfare of future generations. This asymmetric information assumption can be
motivated by the empirical evidence referred to in the introduction. The resulting
welfare optimum is the asymmetric information optimum.
The objective of the center is to maximize total welfare subject to its budget con-
straint. Under asymmetric information, it additionally takes into account incentive
compatibility constraints which ensure that each region has a (weak) incentive to truth-
fully reveal its type.5 According to the revelation principle, the federal government
oﬀers each type of regions a contract stipulating the federal transfer and the region’s
debt. Formally, the welfare maximization problem reads
max
bs,zs,bh,zh
msV (bs,zs,δs) + mhV (bh,zh,δh) (13)
subject to (5) and
V (bs,zs,δs) ≥ V (bh,zh,δs), (ICs)
V (bh,zh,δh) ≥ V (bs,zs,δh). (ICh)
(ICs) and (ICh) are the incentive constraints for s- and h-regions, respectively. (ICs)
requires that a s-region must not obtain lower utility from its own contract than from
the contract oﬀered to h-regions. An analogous interpretation applies to (ICh).
Note that the use of the Utilitarian welfare function (13) may raise conceptual
issues. This function simply sums the welfare of all regions and places equal weight
to both types of regions. Maximizing the function therefore yields one special point
on the Pareto utility frontier of the federation. The use of the Utilitarian welfare
function is nonetheless justiﬁed. It reveals the basic mechanism behind the general
model. Moreover, in Section 6 we will argue that our main results remain unchanged,
if the federal government places diﬀerent weights to s- and h-regions and if the weight
assigned to s-regions is not higher than a certain threshold value.
Using the envelope theorem, the ﬁrst-order conditions to (13) can be written as
(ms +  s)
h




Ug(g1s) − δh(1 + r)Ug(g2s)
i
= 0, (14)
5As usual in the ﬁscal federalism literature, participation constraints are ignored. The underlying
assumption is that leaving the federation is prohibitively costly for a region.
11(mh +  h)
h




Ug(g1h) − δs(1 + r)Ug(g2h)
i
= 0, (15)
(ms +  s −  h)Ug(g1s) − λms = 0, (16)
(mh +  h −  s)Ug(g1h) − λmh = 0. (17)
λ,  s and  h are the Lagrange multipliers associated with (5), (ICs) and (ICh), respec-
tively. In addition to (14) to (17), we have to take into account the slackness conditions
associated with the incentive constraints (ICs) and (ICh). Throughout we suppose the
federal budget constraint is binding so that λ > 0.
As a benchmark, consider ﬁrst the welfare optimum in case of full information. The
center can directly observe the type of a region and ignores the incentive constraints.
In (14) to (17) we have to set  s ≡  h ≡ 0. Denoting optimal values under full
information by the superscript ’o’, we obtain

















s < 0 < zo
h. Moreover, it
satisﬁes (ICh), but violates (ICs).
Proof: Ug(go
1i)/δiUg(go
2i) = 1 + r, i ∈ {s,h}, follows from (14), (15) and  s ≡  h ≡ 0.





(7) holds in both types of regions, we obtain τo
1s = τo
1h. Using (16) and (17) in (14) and
(15) yields δsUg(go
2s) = δhUg(go







is then implied by (7) because F(τ) := 1 − τLτ(τ)/[L(τ) + τLτ(τ)] is an increasing









2h)] > 0. Remember that both types of regions














h. By (5) we obtain zo
s < 0 < zo
h. It remains
to check the incentive compatibility constraints. Using the information derived so far,
we can write V (bo
s,zo
















h,δs) < 0, i.e. (ICs) is violated. By the same argument, we









0 so that (ICh) is satisﬁed. ¥
Proposition 1 states that, under full information, the intertemporal provision of the
public good is undistorted. In both types of regions, the intertemporal rate of sub-
stitution between the public good in period 1 and the public good in period 2 equals
the intertemporal rate of transformation. Since all regions have the same marginal
utility of ﬁrst-period consumption, the quantity of the public good and the tax rate in
period 1 are the same across regions. In contrast, the discounted marginal utility of
second-period consumption is higher for h-regions than for s-regions. High-preference
regions realize a lower tax rate and a higher quantity of the public good in period 2. To
ﬁnance the higher consumption, the center redistributes from low-preference regions
(contributors) to high-preference regions (recipients). Moreover, debt of s-regions is
higher than that of h-regions. While this insight implies that contributors are allowed
to issue more debt than recipients, it is important to note that it does not yet make the
point for diﬀerentiated borrowing constraints. As will be shown in the next section,
the full information optimum can be implemented without any budget institutions.
Let us now turn to the case of asymmetric information. Since the rate of time
preference is private information, a region of a given type can mimic a region of the
other type. As shown in Proposition 1, this information structure implies that the full
information optimum is not incentive compatible. It satisﬁes the incentive constraint
of h-regions, but violates that of s-regions. Low-preference regions have to ﬁnance the
federal redistribution and, thus, by mimicking high-preference regions they receive a
federal transfer and increase their welfare. To ensure incentive compatibility, the center
has to change the optimal contracts such that both incentive constraints are satisﬁed.
Denoting optimal values under asymmetric information by a star, we obtain






















s < 0 < z∗
h.
Proof: Suppose (ICh) is not binding so that  h = 0. This will be proven below. It
follows  s > 0 since otherwise (14) to (17) would yield the full information optimum
13which violates (ICs) according to Proposition 1. (14) and  h = 0 immediately imply
Ug(g∗
1s)/δsUg(g∗
2s) = 1 + r. From (15) we obtain
(mh −  s)Ug(g
∗
1h) = (mhδh −  sδs)(1 + r)Ug(g
∗
2h) > (mh −  s)δh(1 + r)Ug(g
∗
2h)
since δs < δh. (17) and  h = 0 imply mh −  s > 0. Thus, Ug(g∗
1h)/δhUg(g∗
2h) > 1 + r.
Solving (16) and (17) with respect to λ yields






















1h since Fτ(τ) > 0. To prove b∗
s > b∗
h and z∗
s < 0 < z∗
h, note ﬁrst that




h) lie on the
same indiﬀerence curve of s-regions. In addition, (b∗
s,z∗
s) lies at the minimum of this
indiﬀerence curve according to Ug(g∗
1s)/δsUg(g∗
2s) = 1 + r and (10). The U-shape of
the indiﬀerence curve then implies z∗
s < 0 < z∗
h. (b∗
h,z∗
h) lies on the decreasing part of
the indiﬀerence curve of h-regions since Ug(g∗
1h)/δhUg(g∗
2h) > 1+r. The single-crossing
property (12) then proves b∗
s > b∗
h. Furthermore, (ICh) is satisﬁed as presupposed. It













2h)]. By this inequality, g∗
2s ≥ g∗
2h would imply τ∗
2s > τ∗
2h. Remember that both









2h, a contradiction. It
follows g∗
2s < g∗
2h and by equation (7) τ∗
2s > τ∗
2h. ¥
In the asymmetric information optimum characterized in Proposition 2, the intertem-
poral allocation in low-preference regions is still not distorted. This result reﬂects
the no-distortion-at-the-top property in our model. Incentive compatibility is ensured
by two other properties. First, low-preference regions obtain an informational rent in
the sense that their public consumption is increased. Their ﬁrst-period public good
consumption is now larger than in h-regions. Note also that, in the ﬁrst period, s-
regions have the lower income tax rate and, thus, the higher pre- and after-tax labor
income. Second, the intertemporal allocation in high-preference regions is distorted.
The marginal rate of substitution between current and future public consumption ex-
ceeds the marginal rate of transformation. There is a tendency to underprovision in
14period 1 and overprovision in period 2, and high-preference regions are forced to lower
their debt. This distortion makes it unattractive for s-regions to mimic h-regions.
Proposition 2 also shows that the information asymmetry does not change the direc-
tion of redistribution in the federation. Low-preference (high-income) regions are still
the contributors and high-preference (low-income) regions the recipients. Therefore,
the intertemporal allocation of contributors is undistorted while that of recipients is
distorted in favor of future public consumption. This insight should be kept in mind
since it is of crucial importance for the optimal design of budget institutions in the
federation which we will now turn to.
5 Implementation
In the welfare analysis of the previous section, we implicitly assumed that the federal
government can directly control the allocation in the federation, i.e. can directly choose
the level of spending, taxation and borrowing in the regions. Such a setting can serve
as a normative benchmark, but it is obviously not consistent with observed policies in
real world federations. Federal governments are usually responsible for interregional
redistribution only and regions have considerable autonomy in the choice of regional
policies. In this section, we therefore analyze which redistribution scheme allows the
federal government to implement the welfare optimum, if the spending, taxation and
borrowing decisions are decentralized at the regional level.
We consider two redistribution schemes of the federal government listed in Table 2.
Both schemes consists of a c- and a r-program. The c-program aims at contributors of
Table 2: Alternative Federal Redistribution Schemes
redistribution
scheme c-program r-program
R1 lump-sum tax zc lump-sum transfer zr
R2 lump-sum tax zc lump-sum transfer zr
ceiling ¯ b on public debt
15the federal redistribution, i.e. s-regions. It contains a lump-sum tax which contributors
have to pay to the federal government. The r-program is designed for recipients of
the federal redistribution, i.e. h-regions. It comprises a lump-sum transfer which the
federal government pays to recipients. Under redistribution scheme R2, the transfer is
combined with a ceiling ¯ b on regional debt. The recipients’ debt must not exceed this
limit. Note that the ceiling is applied only under the r-program. Regions facing the
c-program may issue higher debt. Hence, scheme R2 resembles the ﬁscal institution
which we found in the U.S. and the European Union since, roughly speaking, it implies
that recipient regions face stricter borrowing restrictions than contributing regions.
The regions take as given the redistribution system of the federal government and
choose public debt in order to maximize their own welfare. By this choice, the regions
also implicitly determine their tax rates and quantities of the public good in both
periods. Under the c-program, the budget constraints of a type i region are represented




Under the r-program of redistribution scheme R1, a region of type i faces the budget
constraints in (4) with zi = zr. It therefore solves the same problem as in (18) except
for replacing −zc by zr. If the region faces the r-program of redistribution scheme R2,
it additionally has to account for the borrowing constraint bi ≤ ¯ b.
We again start with the case of full information. It is then straightforward to show
that the federal government can attain the welfare optimum by the redistribution
system R1: Suppose the center assigns the c-program to s-regions and the r-program
to h-regions. The center is able to do so since it observes the type of a region. Using




nT 1(bs,−zc)L[T 1(bs,−zc)] + bs − zc
i
= δs(1 + r)Ug
h





nT 1(bh,zr)L[T 1(bh,zr)] + bh + zr
i
= δh(1 + r)Ug
h
nT 2(bh)L[T 2(bh)] − (1 + r)bh
i
.
If the federal government sets zc = −zo
s and zr = zo
h, the above conditions match those
of the full information welfare optimum listed in Proposition 1. It follows that the
regions choose bs = bo
s and bh = bo
h. This ﬁnding is summarized in
16Proposition 3. Consider the case of full information and redistribution scheme R1.
Set zc = −zo
s and zr = zo
h. Then the full information optimum is attained.
The intertemporal allocation in the full information optimum is not distorted. Hence,
as shown in Proposition 3, the federal government can implement this optimum by
scheme R1 which contains non-distortionary instruments only. The center simply has
to set the federal taxes and transfers equal to their full information levels. The regions
then choose the optimal debt levels. Budget institutions are not needed to implement
the optimum. Therefore, a federal system with lax borrowing rules for contributors and
strict borrowing rules for recipients cannot be rationalized in case of full information.
Next turn to the implementation under asymmetric information. Under this infor-
mation structure, we know from Proposition 1 and 2 that the full information optimum
is no longer feasible. The objective of the federal redistribution policy is then to im-
plement the asymmetric information optimum. Since the federal government cannot
observe the type of a region, a low-preference region may mimic a high-preference re-
gion in order to obtain the r-program instead of the c-program. The federal government
has to shape its redistribution system such that incentive compatibility is guaranteed
for both types of regions. We obtain
Proposition 4. Consider the case of asymmetric information. Then the asymmetric
information optimum cannot be attained with redistribution scheme R1. Under redistri-
bution scheme R2, set zc = −z∗
s, zr = z∗
h and ¯ b = b∗
h. Then the asymmetric information
optimum is attained.
Proof: Under scheme R1, the ﬁrst-order conditions of the regions’ welfare maximiza-
tion problems are Ug(g1i) = δi(1 + r)Ug(g2i), i = s,h. This contradicts Proposition 2.
To prove the result for redistribution system R2, note ﬁrst that a s-region facing the
c-program realizes (b∗
s,z∗
s). Under the r-program, the s-region maximizes V (bs,z∗
h,δs)
subject to bs ≤ ¯ b = b∗
h. Using the envelope theorem, the derivatives of the region’s
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(8) and (9) imply 1+nT 1
b (L1+τ1sL1
τ) > 0 and −(1+r)+nT 2
b (L2+τ2sL2
τ) < 0. Hence,












1h) − δh(1 + r)Ug(g
∗
2h) > 0. (21)
The last inequality in (21) follows from Proposition 2. (21) together with Vbb(·) < 0
implies Vb(bs,z∗
h,δs) > 0 for all bs ≤ b∗
h. Hence, under the r-program the s-region
chooses bs = b∗
h and realizes (b∗
h,z∗





h). It therefore has no incentive to mimic a h-
region, and redistribution system R2 is incentive compatible for s-regions.
Now turn to a h-region and suppose ﬁrst it faces the r-program. It then maximizes
V (bh,z∗
h,δh) subject to bh ≤ ¯ b = b∗
h. The derivatives of V are analogous to (19) and








1h) − δh(1 + r)Ug(g
∗
2h) > 0. (22)
We obtain Vb(bh,z∗
h,δh) > 0 for all bh ≤ b∗




h). It has no incentive to mimic a s-region since Vb(bh,z∗
h,δh) >
Vb(bh,z∗
s,δh) for all feasible bh. Redistribution system R2 is therefore incentive com-
patible for h-regions, too. ¥
Redistribution scheme R1 leaves undistorted the intertemporal spending decisions of
all regions. But the asymmetric information optimum is characterized by a distortion
of the spending decisions of high-preference regions. This is the reason why the fed-
eral government cannot use scheme R1 to attain maximum welfare under asymmetric
information. In contrast, the limit on regional debt under redistribution policy R2
restricts debt of recipient regions and so distorts their spending decisions in favor of
future public consumption. The debt ceiling also makes the r-program unattractive for
contributors. They voluntarily pay the lump-sum tax under the c-program instead of
mimicking h-regions. By these two properties, the redistribution system R2 implements
the welfare optimum under asymmetric information.
This insight may help to justify the diﬀerentiated budgetary institutions we observe
in many real world federations. The ceiling on regional debt in our model applies to
18recipient regions only. Contributing regions are not restricted in choosing their debt
level and therefore face less stringent budgetary institutions than recipients. Since con-
tributing regions are the high-income regions in the asymmetric information optimum,
the theoretical result also matches our empirical ﬁnding that budget institutions are
less stringent in regions with above average personal income. The main argument our
theoretical analysis provides for diﬀerentiated budget rules is that they help to solve the
self-selection problem of the federal government in the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation. With relatively lax borrowing rules for contributors and with suitable federal
transfers, each region has an incentive to truthfully reveal its type and to implement
the asymmetric information welfare optimum.
With respect to the U.S. evidence, it might be seen critical that in our model the
budget institutions are part of the federal redistribution system while in reality they
are set by the states themselves. But this is only a matter of interpretation. Under
asymmetric information, a region of a given type can mimic a region of the other
type. It can eﬀectively choose between the c- and the r-program and, thus, it also
has a choice between lax and strict borrowing rules. In this sense, the redistribution
system R2 can be interpreted as pork barrel policy between the federal and the regional
governments. The center redistributes resources into a region, but only if the region
chooses budgetary institutions which prevent excessive public debt. Otherwise, the
region is forced to pay the transfer from which the federal government ﬁnances the
interregional redistribution.
6 Extensions and Modiﬁcations
In this section, we will brieﬂy discuss the robustness of our results by extending or
modifying the basic model. Since the formal proofs of the results are quite similar
to the proofs of Proposition 1 to 4, we only report on the results and explain their
intuition. Detailed proofs can be obtained upon request.
As a ﬁrst extension, suppose the federal government maximizes the weighted Utili-
tarian welfare function γmsV (bs,zs,δs)+(1−γ)mhV (bh,zh,δh) with γ ∈]0,1[. The wel-
fare of low-preference regions is weighted by γ, whereas the welfare of high-preference
regions enters the social welfare function with the weight 1 − γ. This welfare function
19is more general than (13) since by varying the parameter γ we can attain every point
on the Pareto utility frontier of the federation. With γ = 0.5, both types of regions
receive the same welfare weights and we obtain exactly the same results as under the
social welfare function (13). But in the general case, there exists a ¯ γ ∈]0.5,δh/(δs+δh)[
such that three cases have to be distinguished: case 1 with γ ∈]0, ¯ γ[, case 2 with
γ ∈ [¯ γ,δh/(δs + δh)[ and case 3 with γ ∈ [δh/(δs + δh),1[.





2h since the ’weighted’ discount factor in h-regions, (1 − γ)δh, is larger than





since the welfare weight of s-regions is not larger than that of h-regions. In this





1h, the incentives properties of the full information optimum
are the same as in the subcase γ ∈]0,0.5]. The welfare weight γ is still suﬃciently
low so that mimicking is proﬁtable for a s-region since the welfare gain in period 2
outweighs the welfare loss in period 1. Hence, in case 1 the full information optimum
is always incentive compatible for high-preference regions, but not for low-preference
regions. This property ensures that the results derived in the previous sections remain
true. The asymmetric information optimum distorts the intertemporal allocation in h-
regions and the center can implement this optimum by redistribution scheme R2. Thus,
the optimality of a redistribution system with laxer budget institutions for contributors
than for recipients can be generalized to a wide class of social welfare function.
Unfortunately, a further generalization to the cases 2 and 3 is not possible. Since
the welfare weight of s-regions is relatively high in these cases, the incentive proper-
ties of the full information optimum change. In case 2, the full information optimum
satisﬁes the incentive constraints of both types of regions. The asymmetric informa-
tion optimum is identical to the full information optimum and the federal government
can implement the optimum without borrowing constraints. In case 3, the welfare
weight of s-regions is so high that the full information optimum satisﬁes (ICs), but
not (ICh). The asymmetric information optimum distorts the spending decisions of
s-regions which are now the recipients. But the distortion is in favor of current con-
sumption. The center can therefore implement the asymmetric information optimum
by a redistribution system which comprises a ﬂoor on the recipients’ debt. This result
20would contrast the result in case 1 since the redistribution system now allows for rela-
tively lax budget rules in recipient regions, not in contributing regions. But ﬂoors on
public debt are rarely observed and hardly imaginable from an empirical point of view.
For the second modiﬁcation of our basic model, we return to the welfare function
(13), but consider another source of information asymmetry. In the previous ﬁscal
federalism literature, it is often argued that the federal government cannot observe
the labor productivity in a region. For instance, Bordignon et al. (2001) suppose the
representative individuals of the regions diﬀer in their eﬀective time endowment and
the center cannot infer this productivity parameter. Analogously, in our model we
may assume that the time endowment is the same for the ﬁrst-period individuals, but
not for the second-period individuals. The time constraints in period 1 and 2 then
read ℓ1i + x1i = 1 and ℓ2i + x2i = 1 + ei with 0 < es < eh, i.e. s-regions have low
and h-regions high labor productivity. Focusing on diﬀerences in period 2 is clearly
simplifying. However, it allows to model in a stylized way the fact that information
asymmetries with respect to future regional characteristics are usually more severe than
information asymmetries with respect to current characteristics.6
In a model with diﬀerences in the labor productivity, we obtain qualitatively the
same results as in the basic model with diﬀerent rates of time preference. Under full
information, optimal redistribution is from high-productivity to low-productivity re-
gions. The welfare optimum is incentive compatible for recipients, but not for contrib-
utors. Consequently, the asymmetric information optimum distorts the intertemporal
allocation of low-productivity regions, and the center can implement this asymmetric
information optimum by imposing a debt limit on low-productivity regions. Hence, we
again obtain the result that lax budget rules for contributors and strict budget rules
for recipients solve the self-selection problem of the federal government.
As a ﬁnal modiﬁcation, we consider a third source of information asymmetry. Pre-
vious studies referred to in the introduction argue that the cost of the regional public
good supply cannot be observed by the federal government. Focusing again on the more
6Oﬃcial statistics and short-run forecasts provide the federal government data which exhibit infor-
mational problems, indeed, but the reliability of these data is surely higher than that of the data ob-
tained from long-run forecasts. Regional governments are usually better informed about, for example,
the long-run demographic change or other regional developments which inﬂuence labor productivity.
This information advantage of the regions is surely smaller in the short-run.
21serve information problem in period 2, we may suppose that regions have diﬀerent unit
cost of the public good in the second period. Denote unit cost of a type i region by θi
with θs < θh. The budget constraints of region i then read g1i = nτ1iL(τ1i) + bi + zi
and θig2i = nτ2iL(τ2i)−(1+r)bi. In this setting, it can be shown that the direction of
redistribution in the federation is determined by the elasticity of the marginal utility of
the public good, η := −gUgg/Ug. If the center reallocates one unit of the public good
in period 2 from h- to s-regions, it gains the diﬀerence in marginal cost, but losses the
diﬀerence in marginal utility of the public good. For η < 1, the former eﬀect dominates
the latter and redistribution in the full information optimum is from h- to s-regions.
If η > 1, the reverse is true, and η = 1 implies that there is no redistribution at all.
Independent of the direction of redistribution, however, the incentive properties of the
full information optimum are almost always the same. Except for the pathological case
η = 1, the full information optimum can be shown to satisfy the incentive constraint
of recipients and to violate that of contributors. Under asymmetric information, the
intertemporal spending decisions of recipients are distorted in favor of future public
consumption and the federal government implements this optimum by redistribution
scheme R2. Hence, redistribution systems with relatively lax budget institutions for
contributors are again eﬃcient.
7 Conclusion
This paper developed a two-period model of a federation consisting of a federal gov-
ernment and several regions. Each region provides a public good ﬁnanced by a distor-
tionary income tax and, in the ﬁrst-period, by public debt and a federal transfer. The
regions diﬀer with respect to the rate of time preference and the federal government
redistributes from low-preference to high-preference regions. In the full information
welfare optimum, the intertemporal allocation is undistorted in each region. This op-
timum can be implemented by a simple redistribution scheme consisting of lump-sum
taxes and transfers. But under asymmetric information, the welfare optimum is char-
acterized by a distortion of the intertemporal allocation in recipient regions. The center
attains this welfare optimum, if it augments the redistribution scheme by a limit on
the borrowing of recipients. This ensures incentive compatibility for contributors.
22Although we already showed that these results are quite robust with respect to vari-
ations in the shape of the social welfare function and the source of the information
asymmetry, there are further sensible extensions of our analysis. Perhaps most inter-
estingly, we considered the diﬀerent sources of information asymmetry only separately.
But the federal government often cannot observe several characteristics of the regions.
So, our analysis may be extended to a two- or multidimensional screening problem
where the federal government cannot infer, for example, the rate of time preference
and labor productivity. The question is then under what conditions our result prevails
and under what conditions it breaks down. These conditions may then provide further
insights in the variation of budget rules in real world federation.
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